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Muslim Women’s Rights Activists’
Visibility: Stretching the Gendered
Boundaries of the Public Space in
the City of Lucknow
Mengia Hong Tschalaer
One thousand four hundred years ago, at the time
of the prophet Muhammed, Muslim women
participated in wars, worked as nurses and
doctors, owned and operated businesses and were
actively involved in public religious life. I am
fighting to get our quranic rights back and to make
Muslim women visible in public again!
1 These are words of the Muslim women’s rights activist Naish Hasan, co-founder of the
Indian  Muslim  Women’s  Movement  (Bharatiya  Muslim  Mahila  Andolan  or  BMMA),
established in 2007, in an interview conducted at her home near Lucknow University in
winter 2010. Hasan’s claim to work toward stretching the boundaries of the politically
contested  public  legal  space  via  struggles  over  competing  definitions  of  religious
knowledge and  authority1 reflects  a  central  plank  in  the  agenda  of  Muslim  women’s
activism in the city of Lucknow. For example, Shaista Amber, president of the Lucknow-
based All  India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board (AIMWPLB) established in 2005,
insists  that  the  Muslim leaderships’  misogynist  interpretations  of  the  Quran and the
Hadith prevent  women  from  participating  in  pubic  religious  life.  In  a  similar  vein,
Shehnaz Sidrat,  president of  Lucknow’s oldest  Muslim women’s  organisation founded
under colonial rule in 1934, Bazme Khawateen (women’s club), takes issue with patriarchal
interpretations  depicting  women’s  active  participation  in  the  public  space  as  an
onslaught on their modesty and, hence, as a religious ‘sin.’ Recent fatwas released by the
eminent  Lucknow-based  Sunni  seminaries  Darul  Uloom  Nadwatul  Ulama  reflect  the
patriarchal  leaning  in  the  ulema’s  (community  of  eminent  religious  authorities)
interpretations of the religious texts. These fatwas (legal opinions) strongly advise women
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against becoming a qazi (judge), a mufti (law expert), or an alima (scholar), and discourage
them from praying in public mosques. By making their bodies seen and their voices heard
within Lucknow’s contested public space,  these middle-class Muslim women blatantly
disrupt  generally  accepted  assumptions  of  women’s  respectability,  egalitarianism,
freedom, and equality.
2 To open up questions on ‘who’ has the authority to interpret the Islamic scripts and of
‘what’ is the ‘true Islam’ currently dominates the agenda of Muslim women’s activists not
only in the city of Lucknow—but also in the Muslim world more generally. Against the
backdrop  of  the  proliferation  of  hard-liner  patriarchal  groups,  the  spread  of
fundamentalist thought and practices, and the growth or reappearance of political Islam,
Muslim women’s rights activism worldwide is geared toward the re-reading of the Islamic
texts and history so as to deconstruct ideas of  womanhood in Islam (Al-Ali 2012).  By
deconstructing gendered Islamic discourse, these Muslim women’s rights activists, often
termed as ‘Islamic feminists’ (Badran 2008; Mirza 2008), produce alternative proposals of
Islamic justice that challenge the authority and power of conservative religious circles
and/or the state.2 The aim of many Muslim women’s rights organisations and networks in
India is similar: to challenge the masculine bent of current interpretations of the religious
texts and history (Kirmani 2009; Vatuk 2008). In India, Muslim women-led networks and
organisations  started  emerging  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  in  urban  centres
(Kirmani 2011: 74). At that time, religious and political conservatism was growing. In this
context,  the  orthodox  All  India  Muslim  Personal  Law  Board  (AIMPLB)  reduced  the
category  of  Muslim  woman  to  a  symbol  of  a  religious  tradition  that  needs  to  be
‘protected’ from the onslaught of Hindu nationalism (Sunder Rajan 2003). This political
process  of  homogenising  and  solidifying  Islamic  discourse  and  tradition  adversely
affected Muslim women’s position under state law. The lack of advocates and supporters
in the secular Indian women’s movement for the cause of improving the lot of Muslim
women sparked some middle- and upper class Muslim women to split from the women’s
movement  in  the  late  1990s  and  find  their  own women’s  organisations  (e.g. Muslim
Women’s Forum in Delhi, the Mumbai-based Women’s Research and Action Group, the
Muslim  Women’s  Rights  Network,  Awaaz-e-Niswan,  AIMWPLB, and  the  BMMA)
(Kirmani 2009; Hasan 1998).3 Although still few in numbers, this ‘nascent Islamic feminists
movement,’ in the words of Sylvia Vatuk (2008), or ‘minority feminism,’ as Nida Kirmani
(2011a, 2011b, 2009) terms it, has in the last decade gained considerable visibility within
the public space.4 In fact, women’s activism and organising around the Gudiya 2004 and
Imrana 2005 cases contributed to the growth in Indian Muslim women’s activism since
the 1980s.5
3 Within the last decade, the city of Lucknow has—like no other city in India—experienced
a  proliferation  of  Muslim  women’s  organisations  which  aim  at  publicly  overturning
chauvinistic  ideals  of  women’s subjectivity in Islam within a contested socio-political
landscape.  Such  a  landscape  includes  the  patriarchal  state,  the  conservative  male-
dominated AIMPLB that claims to represent the entire Muslim community at the national
level,  and the equally male-dominated more recently formed (in 2005)  All  India Shia
Personal Law Board. The current rise of political Islam in the city of Lucknow, nourished
by ideological  tensions between Sunni and Shia groups (Freitag 1989: 249),  galvanised
both  Sunni  and  Shia  women  to  openly  destabilise relations  of  power  and  question
established ideas of  gender equality in Islam. However,  whereas Shia women tend to
debate  issues  of  Islamic  law and practice  within  the  intimate  comfort  zone  of  their
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traditional spiritual meetings called majlis,  which usually take place on religious sites
such as mosque courtyards, Sunni women have more recently carried their struggle for
justice into the politically and ideologically contested public sphere. The presidents and
founding members of the AIMWPLB, the BMMA, and Bazme Khawateen, which are at the
centre of this study, are amongst the most vocal Muslim women’s activists in the city.
Interestingly, despite being co-players in a project of decentering the AIMPLB, they see
themselves as competitors, rather than auxiliaries in their struggle for justice within an
Islamic  framework.  These  activists  prefer  different  Islamic  clothing  styles,  live  in
different neighborhoods, use different ideological and political strategies to vie for the
support of Muslim women (and men) within a highly competitive political and discursive
field, and, not surprisingly, cultivate unique relationships with the state and with Muslim
leadership. In short, Muslim women’s activists’ positioning is neither uniform nor simple,
but fragmented along lines of politics and religious ideology.
4 Drawing from the findings of 10 months of ethnographic fieldwork carried out in the city
of Lucknow,6 this paper looks closely and comparatively at the manner in which the
presidents and founding members of the AIMWPLB, the BMMA,  and Bazme Khawateen,
create space for their activism within contested local and national contexts. I argue that
these public contestations over the meaning of womanhood, freedom, egalitarianism, and
equity evince the fluidity of the categories of Islam and women’s rights on the ground—
revealing Islam as a ‘discursive tradition’ (Asad 2009 [1986]) rather than as a fixed system
of belief and practice. Whereas scholarship on Islam, gender and law in India tends to
discuss Muslim women’s rights struggles in relationship to the state and through the lens
of  Muslim  women  as  the  oppressed  subject  (Patak  and  Sunder Rajan  1989;
Hasan 1998, 1999; Agnes 1999; Sunder Rajan 2003; Chhachhi 2005), this micro-level study
explores  the  multiple  strategies  of  public  self-representation  used  by  these  Muslim
women’s activists to contest widely-accepted notions of Muslim women as relegated to
the private sphere and with no political agency. Such analysis illustrates the multiple
positions of Muslim women’s rights activism—an aspect often neglected in liberal and
modernist scholarship on Islamic gender justice struggles.
 
1. Muslim Women’s Activism in Lucknow –
Manufacturing Respectability within the Public Space
5 The visible Sunni woman who accesses the public space purposely—she organises political
rallies,  teaches  about  Islam  in  parks  and  mosques, and  engages  in  policy  making—
stretches the gendered boundaries of what is considered to be a ‘good’ (shareeef) or ‘bad’ (
haram) woman in ultra-conservative discourse—as for example promoted by the AIMPLB.
Within such discourse, notions of the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ woman converge with the idea of the
‘private’ and ‘public’  sphere. All  too often, scholarship on Islam and gender theorises
Muslim women’s entrance into the public sphere as radical and new and as breaking with
core ideas of Islamic ideology (Papaneck 1982; Forbes 1982; Minault 1982). However, as I
will show below, to frame Muslim women’s subjectivity within the binary of the public
and private sphere neglects the intermediary spaces within which these Muslim women’s
activists currently negotiate political  agency as Islamic subjects.  Phadke,  Ranade,  and
Khan (2009) make an important observation in this regard. Drawing on an intersectional
analysis of gender and space in the city of Mumbai, the authors point out that women
who self-assertively enter the public space tend to represent themselves as ‘bearers of all
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moral  and  cultural  values  that  define  the  family/community/nation’  (2009: 187).
However, instead of analysing such public self-representations as a form of backwardness
—as  modernists  tend  to  do—they  analyse  the  transfer  of  such  moral  discourse,  or
discourse  of  respectability,  into  the  public  space  as  an  opportunity  for  women’s
participation within Mumbai’s strongly male-dominated public space.
6 Similarly, more recent works on Islamic feminism view Muslim women’s goal to achieve
respectability in public as a means to create space for political activism, and consequently
agency.  For  instance,  the  political  scientist  Nilüfer  Göle  (1996)  analyses  the  Islamist
veiling movement of university students in Turkey during the post-1983 period as an
incident where a specific Muslim identity is constructed within the public space. In this
context, she convincingly argues, the veil emerges as a strategy for enlarging women’s
space for political activism in the context of modernisation and liberal aspirations of
nation-building in Turkey. Similarly, Saba Mahmood in her ethnography Politics of Piety
(2005) offers a compelling exposition of the possibilities such embodiments of religious
practices hold for political agency. Mahmood’s work draws on the example of a grassroots
women’s  piety  movement  in  the  mosques  of  Cairo  to  show that  women’s  embodied
religious practices are not simply a reflection of their personal beliefs, but the very means
through which subjectivities are cultivated and agency acquired. Mahmood argues that
this form of pious subjectivity, although seemingly incommensurate with assumptions of
the liberal subject undergirding feminist scholarship, does not stifle women’s agency. In
fact, it constitutes an altogether different form thereof. Such a conceptual framework, as
developed by critical feminist scholarship, is helpful in understanding Lucknow’s Muslim
women’s activists’ claim to assert agency through the embodiment of respectability—a
claim which is often couched in a symbolic language of piety.
7 Let me illustrate. Shehnaz Sidrat (Bazme Khawateen) is a former interior designer who
later took over Bazme Khawateeen, or the women’s club, founded by her mother-in-law in
colonial  India.  In the position of  the club’s  president she designed her own ‘modern
Islamic dress,’ as she calls it. This dress consists of a knee-length and loose beige coat,
loose trousers (salwaar), and a colourful or black scarf tightly wrapped around her face.
When in public, Sidrat often complements this outfit with a pair of big sunglasses. For
Sidrat this kind of dress conforms to the Islamic tenets of ‘modesty’ and ‘simplicity’—
attributes that she considers key for women to maintain respectability within the public
space. This is to say that Muslim women manufacture their religious and gender identity
in public within the complexly layered gendered hierarchies that leave unquestioned the
concept  of  sexual  difference as  established and re-produced through the idea of  the
‘private’ and the ‘public.’ The dress that covers her entire body allows Sidrat to forge a
specific ideal of the good Muslim woman and pay respect to the clergy affiliated with
Lucknow-based Islamic Sunni seminary Firangi Mahal—an institution to which her family
is linked through ties of kinship.
8 Similarly, Shaista Amber, the president of the AIMWPLB, substantially changed her way
of dressing when she became president of the AIMWPLB in 2005. As a wife of an army
officer, and dressed in expensive sarees and wearing the family jewellery, she was in the
line of fire of the criticism by the clergy affiliated with the Darul Uloom Ndawatul. ‘In an
editorial of some Urdu newspaper published by the Deobandi,’ Amber recalls, ‘it was said
that my work and lifestyle were non-Islamic and that I spoke of non-Islamic things. The
Deobandi  called me a deharia,  which designates  a  person who doesn’t  believe in any
religion.’7 In an attempt to counter such accusations, Amber donned the headscarf and
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the simple ankle-length coat. For Amber, the bodily transformation from the upper-class
and spoiled officer-wife to the ‘respectable Muslim women’s activist’  secured her the
respect  and trust  from the  Sunni  community,  and allowed her  to  engage in  politics
without being labelled as a ‘bad’ (kharab) woman or a non-believer. Similarly to Sidrat,
Amber ‘bargains with patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti 1991b)—that is, she conforms to patriarchal
ideas of women’s modesty and purity—to secure the legitimacy of her presence within the
public space.
9 There exists a convergence in methodological terms between Sidrat’s and Amber’s, and
the conservative clergy’s deployment of the discourse of ‘the good Muslim woman.’ Both
discourses are anchored in a hierarchic framework of male supremacy. However, Sidrat
and  Amber  instrumentalise  such  discourse  differently.  Whereas  Sidrat  activates  the
image of the ‘good’ Muslim woman not only to facilitate her activism, but also to express
her respect toward the religious Sunni clergy in Lucknow, Amber mobilises such an image
to gain legitimacy as a representative of Muslim women among Muslim groups in
Lucknow and beyond. Critics of Islamic feminism, such as Qudsia Mirza (2008), lament
that such ‘bargains with patriarchy’ could be detrimental to the reformist endeavour of
these women to secure women’s social, economic and, political rights.
10 Naish Hasan, founding member of the BMMA shares such concern. She responds with
alarm to the growing number of Muslim activists who challenge public space hierarchies
by  ‘uncritically  submitting  their  bodies  to  the  dictates  of  a  bunch  of  self-appointed
religious  leaders’  (read:  the  orthodox  Sunni  and  Shia  clergy),  as  she  bluntly  states.8
Without  denying  the  importance  the  female  body  occupies  in  Islamic  thought  and
practice, Hasan stresses the flexibility the religious texts offer for the interpretation of
what codifies the ‘respectable’ Muslim woman. Although fighting a similar fight as Sidrat
and Amber, Hasan focuses on the mind and not the body as a tool for destabilising ultra-
orthodox notions of the public space as exclusively reserved for men. For Hasan, the
terrain of  struggle is  the pious mind rather than the body,  and her focus is  inward.
Therefore, Hasan questions the idea of space arguing; ‘respect and dignity can be instilled
through the pious mind alone…. There is no need to cover our entire bodies.’ Like most
Muslims in Lucknow and elsewhere in India, Hasan wears the salwaar-kurta: a pair of loose
fitting trousers  combined with a  long,  knee-length shirt.  She additionally covers  her
chest with a long shawl (dupatta). This typical Indian dress is common as well among
Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, and Christians.9
11 So,  eager  to  amalgamate their  public  activism with their  identities  as  ‘good’  Muslim
women, these activists participate in a complex process of self-representation wherein
the feminine Islamic attributes of  simplicity and respectability are infused into their
public  self-representations  as  autonomous  and independent  activists.  These  different
interpretations of  the ‘good’  Muslim woman reveal  once again Islam as  a  ‘discursive
tradition’  (Asad  2009  [1986])  or,  an  area  of  contestation.  Moreover,  these  specific
representations illustrate the fact that the formation of subjectivities, religious identities,
and political agency are situational, rather than rigid. However, women’s visibility within
the public space alone does not (yet) substantially disturb the social order of the public
space—or translate in women’s rights to access it (Phadke et al. 2009). Rather, there needs
to be a radical shift away from a conception of the (Islamic) public space as an inherently
dangerous space for women toward a feminist consciousness of the public space that
establishes women’s right to the public space as a ‘fundamental claim for a more inclusive
citizenship’ (Phadke et al. 2009: 186).
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12 To this end, between 2005 and 2008, Sidrat, Amber, and Hasan have deployed the Hindi,
Urdu, and English language press to push back widely-accepted monolithic renderings of
Muslim women as a symbol of a religious tradition and as relegated to the private sphere.
Using the media as an input channel,  these women have—to different extents—upset
monolithic ideas of gender and the Islamic public space. In what follows I focus on India’s
English language press as an analytical lens through which to analyse the manner in
which these women initiate a more public debate of women’s rights to an equal share of
religious public life.10
 
2. Muslim Women’s Rights Activists’ Public Visibility
and the Media
13 Only a decade ago, Muslim women’s voices hardly surfaced in India’s English language
press. Similarly to Western media coverage, India’s English language press had heretofore
employed a discursive economy in their representation of the issue of Islam and women
that constructed Muslim women as stripped of their civil  rights:  deemed to wear the
burqa,  confined  to  their homes  with  no access  to  education,  deprived  of  political
participation and victims of triple talaq.11 Sabina Kidwai (2005: 392) argues that even the
positive media coverage of Muslim women’s issues typically affords ‘no other face for
Muslim women than one  embodying stereotypes.’  Although Indian media’s  emphasis
upon veiling and upon triple talaq is still alive and well, there currently exists alongside it
reportage that engages ‘positively’ with issues of Muslim women. Taking into account the
request for greater debate on rights of  Muslim women’s activists and academics,  the
media started creating room for making visible disagreement amongst different sections
of Muslims, as well as amongst Muslim women’s activists, in contemporary India. The
result  is  reportage that  goes beyond the political  controversies  and that  is  far  more
progressive  and  rational  (Kidwai  2005: 383).  Such  coverage  increasingly  features
interviews with and stories about Muslim women activists and organisations (Schneider
2009: 62;  Kidwai  2005: 391).  This  coverage  offered  what  is  often  considered  from  a
modernist-liberal view a ‘new’ identity for Muslim women: that of a heterogeneous group
of individuals who critically analyse and argue for social, political, economic, and legal
reform, all from varying perspectives.
14 Sidrat,  Hasan,  and Amber  have  taken advantage  of  this  growing tendency in  India’s
English language press to highlight their voices and the activities of their organisation as
a vital part of public life. Within a transnational media space, where Islam predominantly
appears in conjunction with imagery of war, terrorism, and women’s subjugation, Muslim
women’s  activists  and  Islamic  feminists  tend  to  emerge  as  harbingers  of  ‘women’s
empowerment,’ ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom.’ Using liberal language, the English language
press portrays Muslim women’s activism in terms of its progression toward the liberal
goal  of  absolute equality—or shows the great distance it  still  has to go.  Through the
media, Muslim women’s activists discuss new trends in religious thought on gender and
the  public  space;  women  too  could  participate  and  perform  hitherto  men-assigned
religious duties as knowledgeable Muslim women and Indian citizens.
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Guiding prayers for women in the public women’s (zenana) park
15 Shehnaz Sidrat (Bazme Khawateen) made national headlines when she invited journalists
to report about the prayers that she has been leading for women in Lucknow’s only
women’s park (zenana park).12 Located at the heart of the city of Lucknow but sheltered by
high walls, the park was deemed an appropriate space because of its capacity to shield its
female occupants from the gaze of men. The idea was to offer women a space outside the
home in which to congregate, learn about the Quran, sing religious songs, recite poems,
drink tea and pray. Men were not allowed to participate in these activities. I will note that
the  influential  clergy  in  Lucknow  affiliated  with  the  AIMPLB,  with  its  conservative
interpretations of purdah, strongly discourages women from praying in public. Glorifying
an image of the Muslim woman as a good mother and housewife, the clergy sees a conflict
between  women’s  freedom  to  pray  in  public  and  their  responsibilities  as  good
homemakers.13 Challenging the clergy’s discursive economy that locates Muslim women
entirely within the domestic sphere, Sidrat flung open the gate of the zenana park for
journalists eager to report about an unusual woman-led collective prayer in 2004.
16 Every year, at the occasion of eid (feast of breaking the fast), Sidrat organises a collective
prayer in the park, entitled Salaate Tasbeeh. This is a special prayer—one that the devout
believe may purge them of all sins. Her personal initiative to read the Salaate Tasbeeh, a
privilege otherwise reserved for men amongst Sunnis in Lucknow, met the interest of the
media. Keen to bring to the fore ‘the other face of Islam,’ The Times of India described this
unconventional prayer, attended by several hundred Muslim women, as ‘a testimony to
the free spirit of Lucknow women, who have ensured that it survived male scepticism.’
Giving voice to Sidrat and some of the participants, The Times portrayed the event as an
opportunity for Muslim women to ‘bond’ and to demonstrate ‘female emancipation.’14
This coverage applied a modernist discursive framework within which Muslim women’s
inroads into an otherwise male-dominated arena were labelled ‘modern’ and posited as a
form of ‘empowerment.’
17 In our interview, however, Sidrat frames her intervention within the public space beyond
the binaries of women’s empowerment versus Islamic patriarchy. As she tells me, Muslim
women have offered namaz in the zenana park for over 75 years.  Due to the relative
seclusion of the park, the religious clergy had never opposed this. As long as the gate was
shut and the women remained invisible, there was no uproar. However, when she became
president of Bazme Khawateen in 1994, Sidrat decided to disrupt the spatial boundaries
that shielded Muslim women’s activism from the public eye for so long. Arguing that ‘
purdah [here the term purdah is used in terms of the spatial segregation of the sexes] is
not a hindrance for publicising Muslim women’s public prayers,’ she started to invite the
press to the weekly meetings. She explains that her motivation behind this initiative was
less to solely disrupt the well-travelled imagery of the subjugated Muslim woman than to
contribute to the creation of a feminist consciousness of the public space and the fact that
women too can engage in religious activities outside the domestic sphere. To her mind,
common understandings of the public space in Islam with their specific configurations of
gendered subjectivities and senses of belonging have to be de-naturalised. The publicising
of Sidrat reading namaz is, I argue, transformative as it de-centres—at least to a certain
extent—the public space as a site for normalising male supremacy.
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Construction of a women’s mosque
18 As  mentioned,  Shaista  Amber  is  yet  another  Muslim  women’s  rights  activist  who
currently strives to establish a feminist consciousness of public religious life. Like Sidrat,
Amber has sought to create a public space for Muslim women to lead in worship, but the
way she approached the problem is somewhat different. In 2008 Amber built a women’s
mosque on an empty plot of land near Lucknow. Drawing inspiration from STEPS, a Tamil
Nadu-based  women’s  development  organisation  that  set  up  India’s  first  exclusive
women’s mosque in 2004,15 Amber works to create a space for women where they have
the opportunity to ‘share and discuss their concerns with peers other than the family’
and to ‘offer namaz in the mosque,’ as she says. In the city of Lucknow, as in most parts of
India, to pray in the mosque is a privilege generally reserved for men.16 Needless to say,
the construction of the construction of the women’s mosque created a stir among the
religious elite in Lucknow. Scholars affiliated with the Darul Uloom Deoband in Lucknow,
for  instance,  argue  that  such  ‘revolutionary  methods  to  communicate  with  Allah’
compromise women’s honour and reputation and create social evil.’17
19 For Amber, such rhetoric does not originate from the religious texts. Rather, she argues,
the clergy deploys the image of the sexualised female that poses a danger to the order of
the public space as a means to ‘keep women in the dark about their rights’ and to ‘curtail
women’s freedom of movement.’18 Evoking the iconic Islamic figure Hazrat Bibi Hafsa, one
of the wives of prophet Muhammed who acted as an imam and led women in offering
public namaz,19 Amber profoundly challenges such imagery. ‘A women’s mosque,’ Amber
explains,
allows for women to discuss their concerns outside the family. It is an opportunity
for women to mingle and share their views on religion and everyday life. Such a
mosque therefore  fosters  women’s  self-esteem and community  feeling.  Through
prayers, women can learn a lot about their rights and duties of wives and daughters
and husbands  and sons.  To  withhold  women from praying  in  public,  therefore,
violates women’s right to information. Also, in the future I intend to have a female
imam leading prayers in this mosque.
20 In order to finance the construction of the mosque, Amber sold her heirloom jewellery
handed down to her at the time of her wedding. ‘A maulana (Muslim religious scholar)
with a big name,’ she proudly asserts, ‘laid down the foundation stone of the mosque in
2006.’ The mosque is a modest white-painted one-storey building featuring a sunlit prayer
hall and a hostel (dharamsala). Its minaret—long and thin in shades of green and white—
rises high in the air, dominating the otherwise undeveloped and still affordable area near
the Lucknow airport. A Pakistani maulana inaugurated the mosque in 2008 in the presence
of ‘a lot of journalists and reporters,’ as Amber tells me proudly.
21 Amber strategically involved the media to address public opinion herself. As a result, the
English newspaper The Telegraph praised this unusual women’s mosque as the ‘need of the
hour’ and as a well-travelled concept that is ‘finally knocking on the door of Lucknow, the
centre of Islamic learning.’20 With the support of the media, Amber points to the new
political  possibilities such  a  mosque  could  open  up  for  women  in  a  religiously
conservative  city  such  as  Lucknow.  She  envisions  it  redefining  the  possibilities  for
women’s participation in public religious life. Accordingly, the media reportage stressed
the relevance of such a women’s mosque as a marker of progress and as a timely concept
representing Muslim women’s possibilities in India’s democratic political system. India’s
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English language press refers to such intervention within the public space as ‘highly
relevant’  and  as  a  ‘promise’  for  women’s  future  integration  into  a  male-dominated
society.
22 However,  ‘change needs time,’  demurs Amber.  ‘Women and men in Lucknow have to
realise that the prohibition for women to pray in public, which has been imposed upon
them by the mullahs, only serves the interest of the clerics but not the community.’ In
fact,  notwithstanding the  positive  media  coverage,  women did  not  frequent  Amber’s
mosque on a regular basis until two years after it was built. At my visit in 2009 there were
only one or two women offering namaz in the mosque behind the men-folk. However, at
my second visit in 2011, the number of women who joined the men in offering namaz had
visibly increased. Indeed, instead of just one or two there were now a handful of Muslim
women from Lucknow and nearby villages who had come to pray in the mosque. One was
an economics student from Lucknow University,  who had just recently began coming
there; she informed me that she liked to worship Allah while in the company of men and
women.  She  said  that  offering  namaz in  public  gave  her  a  sense  of  belonging  and
community. Moreover, she enjoyed discussing matters concerning women and religion
with people who, like her, are truly devoted to Islam. It should be noted as well here, that
both women learned about the mosque via newspapers and television.21
23 The question of whether or not Muslim women should be allowed to pray in public is
widely discussed by Muslims from all  over the world.  In fact,  a closer look at online
platforms  such  as  islamweb.net,  islamqa.info,  or  islamicislamic.com  reveals  the
transnational debates underway amongst Muslims worldwide. These platforms serve as
discussion boards, where believers ask ‘knowledgeable’ Muslims for advice on various
issues ranging from the Quran,  the Shariat,  family,  politics to health and science. The
construction of the mosque is therefore more than just a local phenomenon; it is a part of
the ‘social life,’ to take the phrase of Abu-Lughod (2010: 2), of international struggles and
discussions  on  Muslim  women’s  rights  taking  place  across  distance  in  geographical
spatiality and religious orientation. That is to say, Amber’s mosque is a visible marker of
Muslim women’s struggles for social inclusion and integrity as currently debated locally,
nationally, and transnationally.
 
A female qazi and an unconventional wedding
24 The story  of  Naish  Hasan’s  unorthodox wedding  offers  yet  another  example  of  how
Muslim women’s rights activists strive for a more inclusive public space. On August 30,
2008, Naish Hasan achieved (trans-)local celebrity status with her unorthodox marriage (
nikah) to a PhD scholar from Aligarh Muslim University. The wedding was unorthodox for
several reasons. First, Hasan altered her mode of dress. Deciding to break with the well-
accepted custom amongst Muslims in which the bride completely hides her face behind
the veil during the ceremony, Hasan instead donned an embroidered red saree. The end of
the  saree  (pallu) only  loosely  covered  her  long  hair,  leaving  her  face  revealed.
Furthermore, Hasan abstained from wearing ‘big, big jewellery,’ which in her opinion,
reduces otherwise contracting agents to mere objects of the religious tradition.22 Second,
at Hasan’s wedding the BMMA introduced its version of the ‘secular’ marriage contract (
nikahnama) to  the  public. 23 This  contract  asks  for  registration  and  makes  specific
stipulations regarding divorce, maintenance and property. However, the third and most
important reason that this wedding received such enormous national and international
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media coverage was the fact that it was solemnised by a female qazi. Dissatisfied with the
omnipresence  of  men at  Muslim marriages,  Hasan  asked  Syeda  Hameed—a founding
member of the Muslim Women’s Forum, a member of the Planning Commission and a
former  member  of  the  National  Commission on Women—to solemnise  her  marriage.
Considering such a well-educated and knowledgeable woman as Hameed as well-qualified
to take over the function of a qazi, Hasan saw no need for a man to perform the rites.
After  having  received  approval  from  reform-oriented  maulanas in  India,  Pakistan,
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, Hameed agreed to perform the nikah.
25 Just a few days prior to the marriage, Hasan mentioned her unusual wedding ceremony to
a friend of hers—a journalist. The next day, the story was on the front page of a local
newspaper. The article created a big stir among Muslims in Lucknow. Muslim women’s
organisations, including the AIMWPLB, supported the marriage. The clergy, as well as
some scholars of the influential Sunni-dominated AIMPLB, conversely labelled the event,
which would considerably push the radius of women’s activities into the public space,
‘useless’ and ‘unnecessary.’24 AIMPLB executive committee member Naseema Ali Iqtedar
Khan said there is no need for a female qazi to perform the wedding if a man is otherwise
available.25 Fauzia Naseema, also a member of the AIMPLB executive committee, was even
more critical.  She  dismissed Hasan’s  wedding as  ‘nothing else  than a  media  stunt.’26
Meanwhile, the orthodox Lucknow Idgah Committee went as far as to deem the marriage
‘invalid’ and the ceremony a ‘cruel joke on Islamic law.’27 These voices reflect the lines of
fragmentation that run through the Muslim community, laying bare the heterogeneity of
perspectives on gender in Islam that exist on the ground.
26 Hasan believes this unprecedented wedding to have been the first of its kind in India, if
not in the entire Muslim world,  and it  continued to arouse wide media interest.  The
national press The Hindu described Hasan’s wedding as ‘unheard of,’ while the Telegraph 
likened its  effects  to  ‘smashing a  centuries-old glass  ceiling.’  India  Today dubbed the
wedding as ‘breaking with tradition’  and the Times  of  India wrote that  Naish Hasan’s
wedding  ceremony  ‘breaks  many  shackles.’28 Television  stations  all  over  India
broadcasted footage of Hasan’s wedding, which can now be downloaded from YouTube29
and other websites. The footage neatly shows the crowd of journalists wrangling for a
premium spot from which to capture the moment when ‘the woman qazi creates history
in Lucknow.’30 The English press, without exception, viewed this unorthodox marriage as
‘modern,’  ‘progressive,’  ‘provocative’  and  as  a  true  ‘challenge’  to  conservative
conceptualisations  of  women’s  identity  in  Islam.  Within  this  media  explosion,  the
protagonist, Naish Hasan, surfaces as independent, modern, self-assertive, and outspoken
—qualities which challenge conservative and orthodox interpretations of the feminine
ideal that stresses female modesty and subservience. In a personal conversation, Naish
Hasan expressed her gratitude toward the media for publicising her unusual wedding. ‘It
is only through the dissemination of positive imagery of women,’ she asserted, ‘that the
gendered boundaries proscribed by the religious authorities can be effectively probed.’
27 This  wedding,  like  the  mosque  and  the  public  prayers,  shatters  hegemonic  Islamic
ideology that  normalises  women’s  inability  to  perform religious  duties,  or  any other
functions in public life. Using the technique of ijtihad (interpretive science of juridical
reasoning), or, what Qudsia Mirza (2008: 31) terms the ‘cultural revival’ strategy, these
Lucknow-based  Muslim  women’s  activists  have  successfully  demonstrated  the
possibilities that Islamic ideology holds for women within the public space, and they have
shrewdly enlisted the media as a tool to ensure that their positions reached as broad an
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audience as possible. In short, such publicly visible interventions create an important
environment for Muslim women to work toward a more inclusive conceptualisation of
the public Islamic space. I therefore argue that current efforts by Muslim women’s rights
activists to resist widely-accepted ideas of Muslim women’s restricted access to the public
space,  using religious  discourse  and rhetoric  to  do so,  open up new possibilities  for
political agency.
 
3. Women’s Spaces within the Patriarchal Legal
Landscape
28 The comparative analysis of Muslim women activists’ multiple strategies to stretch the
gendered boundaries of the public space, renders insight into dimensions of power that
profoundly  shape  Muslim women’s  participation  in  the  domain  of  politics,  law,  and
religion in contemporary India. The three Muslim women’s activists at the centre of this
paper challenge the authority of the orthodox clergy with their overt representations of
alternative proposals of women’s possibilities in Islam—through embodied dimensions of
knowledge production. They provocatively challenge hegemonic ideas on gender. Instead
of accepting widely-accepted definitions of purdah,  or Islamic modesty,  they re-frame
them. Instead of complying with the dictate of Muslim women’s invisibility, either by
staying at home or hiding their bodies underneath a loose niqab, they point to the quranic
female icons that have earned respect with their contributions to public life. Through
intellectual  engagement  with  religious  texts,  these  activists  probe  the  misogynist
understanding  of  public  space.  Specifically,  by  enlisting  the  media to  circulate  their
alternative interpretations of  women’s  rights  in Islam,  Sidrat,  Hasan,  and Amber are
currently  working  toward  the  democratisation  of  the  political  and  legal  space—
destabilising the political power wielded by various orthodox factions. In short, using the
Indian mass media as an input channel, these Lucknow-based Muslim women’s activists
work toward carving out spaces of autonomy from which to demonstrate the possibilities
that Islamic ideology holds for women within the public (and the private) space.
29 In  its  abstractions,  these  activists’  approach  points  toward  an  understanding  of  the
flexibility of Islamic ideology and practice that is indicative of the unevenness of the
categories of justice and gender within ideologically contested legal and political sites
(Asad 2009 [1986]). Sidrat, Amber, and Hasan do not feel uncomfortable with their
religious beliefs and precepts; rather, it is the power configuration that hinders their
participation within the public space that sits uncomfortably with them and hinders their
full participation in religious life. So instead of rejecting religion as a framework through
which  change  can  be  achieved—as  Western  liberal  feminists  would  do—they  self-
assertively appropriate religious language and practice to establish a women-friendly
consciousness  of  gender  relations in  Islam.31 Muslim  women’s  activists’  efforts  to
consciously  reshape  women’s  subjectivity  through  a  religious  framework  not  only
destabilises hegemonic ideas on women in Islam, but also contributes to the pluralisation
of Islamic thought and practice on a (trans-)national and local level. Muslim women’s
activists in the city of  Lucknow see Islamic cultural  practice as ‘object of  humanistic
inquiry,’ according to the legal anthropologist Annelise Riles (2005: 1032), rather than a
fixed  and  unchangeable  ideology.  In  order  to  successfully  challenge  widely-accepted
configurations  of  gender  and  power  relations,  these  activists  have  to  convincingly
Muslim Women’s Rights Activists’ Visibility: Stretching the Gendered Boundari...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 11 | 2015
11
demonstrate that Islamic culture and practice are not static, but can be adjusted so as to
secure women’s respectability, egalitarianism, freedom, and equality.
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NOTES
1. Santos (2002: 360) defines power as social relations of interests and knowledge. What makes
social relations an exercise of power, however, is, according to Santos (2002: 356–362), drawing
on  Foucault,  the  unequal  distribution  of  knowledge  that  exists  among  individuals  and/or
organisations. According to Foucault (2010: 174–175), power and knowledge directly imply one
another as there are no power relations without the correlative field of knowledge. Nor is there
any knowledge that does not presuppose as well as constitute power relations.
2. In the context of the Middle East and Northern Africa there exists a large body of scholarship
on Islamic feminism. See for example Margot Badran (1995) for Egypt, Anouar Majid (2002) for
Morocco and Valentine M. Moghadam (2002),  Ziba Mir-Hosseini  (1999) or Afsaneh Najmabadi
(1993) for Iran.
3. Muslim women’s rights activism in India is by no means a new phenomenon, but dates back to
colonial  times.  Back  then  some  elite  reform-oriented  Muslim  women  discussed  issues  of
education  and purdah in  elite  ‘clubs’  (Minault  1998;  Lateef  1990).  However,  Muslim women’s
rights  organisations  and  networks  that  openly  contest  misogynistic  interpretations  of  the
religious  texts  as  well  as  Muslim  women’s  political  and  economic  discrimination  and
marginalisation – issues that are by and large left unaddressed by the state as well as the Muslim
leadership – emerged only in the aftermath of Shah Bano in the 1980s (Kirmani 2009: 76).
4. Shaista Amber, Shehnaz Sidrat, and Naish Hasan all see themselves as activists rather than
feminists. Although acknowledging the fact that a lot of their activism corresponds with liberal
feminists’ endeavours to further women’s participation in the spheres of politics and law, they
strongly feel that a ‘radical’ feminist label could discredit their community membership.
5. The first case concerned the 28-year-old Imrana, mother of five children, who accused her
father-in-law of raping her in June 2005 in a small village in Uttar Pradesh. In this case, the jati-
panchayat decided that by having had sex with her father-in-law, Imrana had in fact become the
mother  of  her  husband.  Her  husband  was  henceforth  haram or  illegal.  Imrana  ignored  the
decision made by the jati-panchayat and continued to live with her husband. As a response, the
leading Islamic seminary Darul Uloom Deoband issued a fatwa (legal opinion) based on the Hanafi-
school  of  Islamic  jurisprudence,  stating  that  Imrana  is  no  longer  rightfully  married  to  her
husband. The second case concerns Gudiya, who was carrying the child of her current husband
when her presumed-dead first husband returned after five years from the Kargil war. In this
particular case, the elders of the village council forbade Gudiya to stay with her husband of three
years, whose baby she was expecting at that time. Instead, in the name of Islam, the religious
authorities ordered Gudiya to return to her soldier husband to whom she was originally married
for  only two weeks before he was called to  service.  The attempts  of  her  second husband to
reinstate the marriage were futile, and Gudiya died a year later of blood poisoning, at the age of
26 (Kirmani 2009: 74).
6. I conducted over 70 open and semi–structured interviews with members and representatives
of the AIMPLB, the AISPLB, the above-mentioned Muslim women’s rights organisations, and the
state courts. These interviews were conducted in English, Hindi, or Urdu.
7. Interview with Shaista Amber by the author, Lucknow, 15 December 2009.
8. Interview with Naish Hasan by the author, Lucknow, 26 January 2010.
9. Of  course,  within an orthodox and conservative institutional environment,  Hasan subjects
herself to criticism on the part of mainly the ultra-orthodox Muslim clergy. For example, in April
2010  the  orthodox  seminary  Darul  Uloom,  Deoband,  India,  issued  a  controversial  and  highly
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criticised fatwa, which forbade women to work in the public sector and enter politics without
wearing the full-body veil (hijab).  See also Yoginder Sikand’s discussion on the Darul Uloom’s
fatwa (http://www.countercurrents.org/sikand140510.htm, accessed 11 November 2012).
10. One reason for my focus on India’s English language press is that it is, compared to local
Hindi  and  Urdu  newspapers,  easily  accessible.  Nationally  and  internationally  well-respected
newspapers such as The Times of India, India Today, The Hindu, or The Telegraph are readily available
online. Another reason for focusing on India’s English language press is the fact that all three
activists  discussed  in  this  paper  were  eager  to  explore  the  possibilities  that  national  and
international reportage offered for their activism beyond their locality. Often, Sidrat, Amber, and
Hasan pitched their stories to both the national English and local Urdu and Hindi press so as to
maximise their outreach, and strengthen the voices of women’s activists in India and abroad. It
is, however, important to keep in mind that such exclusive focus on English sources comes with
certain limitations.  First,  it  narrows the scope of  my analysis  to  the reportage produced for
India’s English-speaking elite. Second, such reportage tends to follow Western opinion-making—
reproducing  modernist  liberal  perceptions  of  Islam  and  women.  During  my  research  I  also
collected and translated Hindi and Urdu newspaper articles which appeared between 2009 and
2011. These reportages, mostly concerned with the various rallies, workshops and seminars that
have been organised by Sidrat,  Amber or Hasan,  were very useful  for analysing some of  the
contests and dissensions that exist amongst Muslims in Lucknow regarding issues of gender-
related religious practices and ideologies.
11. The reporting by the mass media in the West has suffered from the same misinterpretations
and  misrepresentations  of  Muslim  women,  which  has  substantially  contributed  to  their
stereotyping as victims and as mute. For instance, Lila Abu-Lughod (2002) has criticised the ways
in which the media and the U.S. government have deployed the popular standard knowledge
about  Muslim women that  portrays  them as  oppressed,  as  forced  to  wear  the  burqa and  as
relegated  to  the  domestic  sphere  in  their  rhetoric  on  the  war  in  Afghanistan  (2002:  785).
Similarly, Katherine Bullock (2002: 122–133), who analysed the representations of Iraqi women in
articles that were published in the New York Times since the official beginning of the war, argues
that in the context of such press releases Islam and Muslim women have been subject to strong
normative and stereotyping discourses. She asserts that the trope of the covered female body
emerged as  a  yardstick  according  to  which progress  is  measured.  Along such lines,  Islam is
depicted as  incompatible  with Western notions of  secularism and liberalism (2002:  89).  Such
representations of Muslim women were also criticised for being Orientalist (Said 2003 [1978]). For
instance, postcolonial scholars such as Homi Bhabha (1984), Talal Asad (2009 [1986]) and Chandra
Talpade  Mohanti  (1988)  decried  Western  Orientalist  representations  of  the  non-West  as  a
strategy which normalises the dominance of ‘the West’ over ‘the East.’
12. The women’s, or zenana, park is a piece of land in the heart of Old Lucknow that was allotted
by the city to the then newly-formed Bazme Khawateen in 1934.
13. AIMPLB member Ateeq Qasmi, interview by author, Lucknow, 3 March 2011.
14. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2004-10-31/lucknow/27159961_1_muslim-
women-offer-prayers-bazme-khawateen (accessed 15 April 2012).
15. For  more  information  on  the  women’s  mosque  see:  http://sports.rediff.com/news/2004/
aug/11muslim.htm (accessed  26  September  2012)  and  http://www.outlookindia.com/
printarticle.aspx?224749 (accessed 26 September 2012).
16. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_clerics-rattled-over-namaz-by-women_1163193
(accessed  15  April  2012);  http://www.hindu.com/2008/05/07/stories/2008050753660500.htm
(accessed  April  15,  2012);  http://www.indianexpress.com/news/begum-has-many-aces-under-
her-veil/449378/ (accessed  April  15,  2012);  http://www.siliconindia.com/shownews/
Women_offer_prayers_at_mosque_defy_seminarys_edict-nid-41858-cid-3.html (accessed 15 April
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2012);  http://wunrn.com/news/2008/05_08/05_19_08/051908_india.htm (accessed  April  15,
2012).
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ABSTRACTS
Within  the  last  decade,  Muslim women’s  rights  activists  in postcolonial  India  have  acquired
increasing visibility within the contested public space. This paper looks pointedly at the manner
in which three ideologically different Muslim women’s rights activists work toward carving out
women’s spaces within the men-dominated political and legal landscape in the city of Lucknow.
In  doing  so,  it  examines  first:  how  Muslim  women’s  activists  carefully  orchestrate  their
appearance within the public space, and second: their strategic utilisation of the media for the
dissemination of their alternative proposals concerning the ‘true Islam’ and the ‘ideal Muslim
woman.’ This paper argues that Muslim women’s rights activists’ interventions within the public
space destabilise hegemonic patterns of knowledge and authority. Laying bare the possibilities
Islamic discourse and its embodiment offer for women’s agency, this paper challenges liberal and
modernist  perspectives  that  view  religion  as  being  obstructive  to  women’s  freedom  and
autonomy.
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